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Abstract—One of the most significant changes in Higher 
Education pedagogy that has occurred over the past fifty years is 
the idea that university students should not just be taught 
theoretical subject knowledge but should engage with practical 
aspects of their course so developing the skills and professional 
competences that will allow them to gain successful employment 
after graduation. In this paper, we relate this development to the 
Aristotelian notion of intellectual virtue and specifically the 
concept of phronesis. We discuss the way in which this idea has 
developed from classical beginnings to the modern educational 
setting, and argue that the notion of phronesis, that is, practical 
wisdom or prudential judgement, is crucial to a range of activities 
which are fundamental to science, engineering and computing 
education. These include an understanding of what it means to 
engage in authentic learning and the solution of open-ended or ill-
structured problems. We also discuss the role the concept plays in 
describing key features of work-based learning. Finally, we make 
some comments concerning the relative value the education system 
places on different types of knowledge, and why an appropriate 
understanding of phronesis allows for a proper appreciation of 
contingent knowledge within the curriculum.  
Keywords— phronesis; practical wisdom; authentic learning; ill-
structured problems; work-place learning 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the Nicomachean Ethics [1], Aristotle argued for the 
existence of three forms of knowledge: "episteme" or theoretical 
knowledge, "techne" or craftsmanship, and "phronesis", that is, 
practical wisdom or prudential judgement. Historically, with 
some exceptions, Higher Education has tended to prioritise the 
delivery of theoretical knowledge, with the demonstrative 
sciences being given a special prominence in the curriculum. It 
can be argued that Engineering, which from its beginnings as an 
academic discipline, included a strong practical focus [2] and so 
suffered less than the more established subjects in this respect. 
While the Pure/Applied distinction found in Mathematics or the 
Theoretical/Experimental divide which occurs in the Natural 
Sciences is not as stark, there was still a tension between the 
analytic, "Engineering Science" attitude of the European 
universities and more pragmatic, practical approaches. 
More recent educational approaches have also sought to 
incorporate the acquisition of relevant skills and competencies 
into the learning process, for example, as vehicles for the 
assessment of authentic learning, and as important ways of 
enhancing social goods such as graduate employability. These 
two aspects of educational development appear to relate to the 
first two types of Aristotelian knowledge, but what about the 
place of practical wisdom? Does phronesis play an important 
part in in modern subject-based curricula and, if so, is it possible 
to teach prudential judgement in a computing education context? 
In this paper, we give a brief overview of the Aristotelian 
intellectual virtues and, specifically, the concept of phronesis. 
We outline its appearance in modern educational literature and 
discuss the relevance of prudential judgment in practical 
learning environments, especially with reference to authenticity 
in vocational education and workplace learning. We argue that 
concepts found in these educational settings can be profitably 
applied in the disciplinary context of computing and 
engineering, and discuss the application of these ideas to popular 
teaching practices such as the use of real-world projects and the 
hard task of teaching students how to address open-ended or ill-
structured problems [3, 4]. The basic line of argument is this: a 
fundamental element of modern university-level education in 
any science or engineering subject is to provide learners with an 
authentic learning experience in the chosen discipline. This 
inevitably leads to participation in learning activities that closely 
resemble the practices found in the workplace and these often 
involve problems which are open-ended or ill-structured. It is 
important, therefore, to provide students with the capability of 
addressing these types of problems and this requires them to 
have an understanding of the underlying principles on which the 
problem is based, as well as the relevant technical abilities to 
implement a method of solution. However, these attributes are 
not, in themselves, sufficient to engage with ill-structured 
problems since they often demand that students demonstrate the 
capacity to make practical or prudential judgements about 
complex and unfamiliar issues, such as the priorities needed to 
begin to address the problem context. This is information which 
may only become available to the learner as the solution is being 
constructed and requires a process of evaluation or judgement 
which is based in the specific context of the problem and so is 
difficult to specify prior to starting the problem-solving process. 
We therefore argue that the skill of developing these forms of 
practical wisdom or prudential judgement is crucial in today's 
educational environment and that allowing students to engage in 
such practices will enhance their professional competencies and 
so promote their academic growth.  
Given the importance claimed for this type of activity, we 
investigate where it could be placed within the computing or 
engineering curriculum and what the development of these skills 
would look like in a particular learning environment. 
II. FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE 
While the Ethics is a fundamental text of the Western 
philosophical canon, it is not usually invoked as a primary 
source for developing contemporary educational practice. 
Nevertheless, a general understanding of the intellectual virtues, 
in the form of the basic description presented below, together 
with an attempt to incorporate that understanding of these 
qualities into a modern philosophical and educational setting, 
has been a consistent feature in the work of a number of 
prominent philosophers. Moreover, we would contend that the 
virtues themselves, perhaps suitably transposed into more 
accessible terminology, and understood in the context of modern 
educational ideas, do present an interesting and productive 
description of learner epistemology. Consequently, we first 
briefly describe the classical notion of phronesis before 
identifying ways in which modern thinkers have appropriated 
the terminology to describe a range of related concepts. 
A. The Classical Idea of Phronesis 
Aristotle devotes some considerable effort within the 
Nicomachean Ethics to discussing what have since become 
known as the intellectual virtues, of which, episteme, techne and 
phronesis are the most significant in an educational context. It is 
important at the outset to recognise that the term "virtue" is not 
to be understood in its modern, moral sense, but rather as a 
disposition that make it possible for people to think, and act in a 
certain way, appropriate to the situation in which they find 
themselves. In his discussion of these dispositions, Aristotle 
introduced a number of terms which distinguish what we would 
now call types of knowledge and form the basis of his 
epistemological theory.  
The first, episteme is a form of propositional knowledge that 
is demonstrable, that is, legitimately derivable from more 
fundamental principles and, as such, is context independent. 
Given the universality of these principles, it is tempting to see 
this concept as a precursor of modern "scientific" knowledge, 
and many translations do indeed use that word. However, it is 
clear that, when used in its original form, there is no simple 
identity with ideas of post-Enlightenment "science", which 
simply did not exist at that point in time. Episteme aims at the 
attainment of timeless or universal truth, such as that found in 
mathematics or metaphysics, and conveys the idea of knowledge 
sought for its own sake.  
The second intellectual virtue is techne. This describes a 
form of knowledge expressed in terms of craftsmanship or 
artistry, and so is sometimes translated, in a modern context, as 
"technical expertise" or "artistry". This type of knowledge has 
been characterised as "knowing how" to do something and, since 
this depends on the situation in which the action is to take place, 
it is context-dependent, with the production of some kind of 
artefact as its primary aim. Kemmis and Smith [5] state that it is 
the disposition to act in a true and reasoned way, relative to the 
standard rules of the discipline or profession involved. As such, 
it results in an instrumental type of knowledge, the reasoning 
involved being contextual and employed to achieve some known 
or designated outcome.  
The third virtue is that of phronesis, which Aristotle defines 
as ‘a true and reasoned state or capacity to act with regard to 
the human good’. It is often translated into modern language as 
"practical wisdom" [6], "prudence" [7] or "practical reason" [8], 
and differs from its theoretical counterpart in its focus on action, 
rather than cultivating a more passive understanding of an idea, 
event or object. It incorporates the capacity for moral judgment, 
and cognitive understanding and insight, and, significantly, 
results in some kind of practical outcome. It therefore underpins 
the capacity to develop practical understanding and the 
disposition to act wisely and justly within the world. Although 
not a moral virtue in itself, the ability to evaluate the right end in 
a particular situation, and so make a wise or prudential 
judgement, is nevertheless aligned with the moral sense and is 
directed towards that same objective. The result of the process 
of deliberation is some positive action, and, consequently, 
phronesis has often been described as a disposition to "do 
something" (praxis) in contrast to the disposition to "make 
something" (poiesis) which characterises the other virtue of 
techne.  
Despite this classification system, it was realised, even in 
classical times, that there is some degree of ambiguity at the 
margins of any consideration of this kind. Some activities or 
professions, such as medicine or navigation, in which right 
judgement would appear to play a significant part, are, 
nonetheless, characterised classically as techne and the dispute 
about assignment of medical skills to which form of knowledge 
is still a contested issue (e.g. [9, 10, 11]). Nevertheless, from the 
perspective of most educational practitioners, these are 
somewhat esoteric debates and discussion of the classical scope 
and exact meaning of the terms are of limited interest. Of greater 
importance is the possible development and re-expression of the 
concept in modern education vocabulary 
B. Phronesis as Reflective Judgement 
In the past hundred years, the concept of phronesis has been 
appropriated and employed by a number of philosophers, social 
scientists and educationalists as an important concept in a variety 
of contexts, ranging from the phenomenological works of 
Heidegger [12], through the philosophical hermeneutics of 
Gadamer [13], to the virtue ethics of Macintyre [14]. In an 
educational setting, the concept has been applied to a number of 
areas. These include the task of improving teaching practices, 
where the notion of phronesis has been used to provide a vehicle 
for inferring the implied arguments that lead to particular course 
of action, e.g. Green [15] and Fenstermacher [16], and as a tool 
for understanding the competencies and thinking processes of 
both students and teachers. Central to this line of thought was 
the idea of "deliberation" [17, 18] which sees the exercise of 
phronesis as similar to the practice of reflective judgement 
found, for example, in the works of Schön [19, 20]. 
This emphasis on the evaluative and inferential nature of the 
concept is also found in the work of educational theorists such 
as Dunne [6] who investigated the contextual nature of 
judgement, i.e. what one should do in a particular situation to 
accomplish a particular objective or goal. This focus on 
situational appreciation (or "attentiveness" as Smith [21] termed 
it) is also found in the work of Kessels and Korthagen [22] who 
developed an account of phronesis which emphasised "the 
understanding of specific concrete cases and complex or 
ambiguous situations”. 
Phronesis, therefore, is tied into a constellation of 
pedagogical ideas and concepts involving the application of 
reflective judgement, specifically in the context of decisions 
about the practical aspects of solving a problem, and the 
evaluation of the most prudent way of proceeding. It is 
irreducibly contextual and, consequently, cannot be subsumed 
by purely procedural methodologies. 
C. The Educational Motivation for Phronetic Activities 
If we accept that it is desirable to provide students with the 
opportunity to develop skills which promote good judgement, 
then we need to create learning environments with activities that 
foster these evaluative or decision-making capacities. The task 
of developing such skills through a process of discernment and 
prioritisation of relevant issues, has been addressed by a number 
of researchers. For example, Bowden and co-workers have 
examined the problem in the context of Capability Theory and 
attempts to extend its scope to incorporate the idea of Threshold 
Concepts [23, 24]. In this work, they stress the need for the 
following elements to be prominent in any learning situation 
[25]: 
• Students should experience open situations in which 
discernment is a necessary requirement of the learning 
process. 
• There is a need for students to engage with real-word 
problems within their domain of study. 
• Students should have the opportunity to develop trial 
solutions and should understand the need to reflect on the 
outcomes of these trials in order to develop an 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of 
different approaches. 
• There should be appropriate feedback from teachers and 
other professionals about the nature and quality of 
student engagement in the educational processes that lead 
to learning. These include ideas around reflective 
judgement such as discernment and diagnosis, as well as 
the more common elements of the design and 
implementation of methods of solution.  
• Finally, there should be formal assessment of the 
processes of learning, not just the outcomes, and this 
should be done in a way that integrates knowledge and 
skill acquisition across the curriculum. 
If one reads these criteria alongside more familiar 
educational proposals that arise from the work of Schön [19, 20] 
or Kitchener and King [26], it is reasonably clear that there is 
some degree of similarity and synergy between the modern 
conceptualisation of phronesis and the notion of reflective 
judgement. In addition, if, for example, we consider the above 
set of requirements for developing educational environments 
and activities that promote skills in judgement alongside work-
based learning (WBL) research (e.g. Boud and Solomon [27]), 
we see that there is also a strong connection with ideas that 
emerged from consideration of authentic learning. This should 
come as no surprise as the relevant criteria used for making 
judgements about processes, or evaluating artefacts, will draw 
heavily on those that are set by experts, and, in a subject that has 
a strong work-based element, these will be determined by 
mature practitioners working in the field. 
III. JUDGEMENT AND AUTHENTIC LEARNING   
The description given above of the development of learning 
environments which promote phronesis are very similar to those 
which aim at providing "authentic" learning experiences for 
students. therefore, before looking in more detail at phronesis in 
a work-based learning environment, we give a brief account of 
authenticity which illustrates this and helps to motivate the 
investigation of phronesis in the context of workplace learning. 
The conceptual antecedents of the idea of authenticity, 
understood as an important element of a pedagogical theory, can 
be found in the work of Brown, Collins and others, e.g. [28, 29] 
on situated knowledge and cognitive apprenticeships. From their 
perspective, in order to enter into the practices of a particular 
profession or community of practice, the learner needs to 
assimilate the behaviour and values of that community. This is 
essentially a type of enculturation in which the student 
appropriates the attitudes and practices of the community by 
identification with its more experienced and proficient members. 
Situated learning therefore required the development of 
knowledge and skills in contexts that reflect the way in which 
that knowledge will be useful in real life [30]. This approach was 
later elaborated and extended in the work of Lave and Wenger 
on the social context of learning, e.g. [31]. Similarly, the concept 
of authenticity was being used by Archbald and Newmann [32, 
33] in the context of developing and aligning curriculum, 
teaching and assessment practices with real-world activities. 
Authenticity in the learning process arose partly out of this real-
world correspondence, but also involved a constructivist 
approach to learning and the development of proficiency in the 
normative process of enquiry within the discipline. This, in turn, 
built on the learner's prior knowledge within the subject area in 
question.  
This model of authentic learning was influential and, for 
example, informed subsequent developments of the concept 
such as that of Shaffer and Resnick [34] who argued that student 
perceptions of authenticity were linked to the alignment between 
the learning process and meaningful elements of the curriculum. 
These included: 
• A learning experience that was personally meaningful to 
the student, 
• A "real-world" context outside the immediate classroom 
environment,  
• Learning that provides an opportunity for students to 
"think in the modes of a particular discipline",  
• An operational view of authenticity in which the 
assessment process reflects the learning process. 
Shaffer and Resnick argued that this “thick” view of authenticity 
allowed for a fuller understanding of the nature of authentic 
learning and by doing so, reiterated views about the context in 
which authenticity was likely to be perceived. It is also worth 
noting the similarities between the description of an authentic 
learning environment, that is, one where authentic learning is 
promoted, and the description of an environment in which good 
judgement is promoted [25]. In both cases, there is an emphasis 
on learning using real-world scenarios. There is also a focus on 
the dynamic process of learning, described either in terms of 
devising and evaluating trial solutions to problems, or thinking 
in the modes of the discipline. It is interesting to observe that 
both of the aspects of authenticity connect with the practice of 
addressing open or ill-structured questions within the course of 
study.  
 While the idea of authenticity is certainly appealing from an 
educational perspective and can be used to motivate learning, 
particularly in practical contexts, there are issues about how it 
relates to assessment practices, especially in those situations and 
environments where it would be expected to be most useful, 
such as workplace learning. Before investigating the application 
of ideas about phronesis to the type of open-ended or ill-
structured problems found in work-based learning situations, we 
make a small digression to consider the assessment of authentic 
learning and the related concept of authentic assessment. 
IV. AUTHENTICITY IN THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
 Authenticity in the assessment process is clearly a 
significant issue for educators and most modern learning 
approaches attempt to address this concern. In the context of 
work-based learning, it is interesting to recall that the 
etymology of the word assessment derives from the Latin verbal 
construction ‘ad + sedere’ - to sit down beside - and therefore 
appears to connote a model of appraisal which is closer to that 
of mentorship, providing guidance and feedback on the 
knowledge and skills that have been learnt. With the advent of 
the modern university system and, certainly, with the societal 
changes that drive mass higher education, this mentorship 
model has been pushed into the background. Nevertheless, in 
recent times, almost all educational theorists who address the 
purpose and practice of assessment have recognised its 
importance for learning, e.g. see Boud [35, 26]. 
 So, for example, the intimate link between assessment, 
student learning and performance not only forms the main idea 
behind the constructive alignment programme of Biggs [36] but 
also features as a central component in educational theories 
which developed from the work of Bandura [37] on self-
efficacy.  
Some degree of caution should be noted here when 
discussing ideas of authenticity in the context of learning and 
assessment. Cumming and Maxwell [38] noted that an 
interesting semantic shift occurred in the wider discussion that 
took place around the concepts of achievement and assessment 
and the relationship of these ideas to the notion of authenticity. 
At some point, “assessment of authentic achievement”, which 
places an emphasis on an appraisal of the authentic nature of the 
achievement or the learning, evolved into ‘authentic assessment 
of achievement’ which places an emphasis on the manner of 
assessment and could leave the nature of the achievement itself 
unexamined. This is not to deny that "authentic assessment" is a 
valid and important concept which deserves to be the subject of 
academic study, but there is certainly a difference in the meaning 
of these phrases and they should not be confused. 
If one examines the process of assessment, the focus adopted 
has a substantial impact on both the teaching and the realisation 
of intended learning outcomes [39]. A key observation is the fact 
that assessment tasks serve to signal curricular priorities to 
students. Authentic assessment tasks therefore function as 
mechanisms for academic and professional regulation through 
which the community of practice, in the form of the assessor, 
can direct the attention of students to prescribed content areas 
and modes of disciplinary thought, especially decision-making 
processes. 
Conversely, the assessment tasks need to take account of the 
context of learning as well as the operational details of the 
teaching process. This can be particularly challenging in modern 
educational settings, where both teacher and student are often 
compelled to direct their efforts to the satisfaction of assessment 
goals for non-academic, institutional reasons, regardless of 
whether these promote learning in the most effective way. A 
close alignment should therefore exist between teaching 
processes, learning goals, assessment procedures and learning 
and achievement [36]. 
Cumming and Maxwell identified four different 
interpretations of authentic achievement and assessment based 
upon the different approaches to learning and teaching and 
different understandings of epistemological and pedagogical 
fundamental concepts. Specifically, they argued that the main 
conceptions of assessment were based on performance, situated 
learning and situated assessment, what they called “the 
complexity of expertise” which was assessed using problem-
based assessment, and competence-based assessment. In each of 
these cases, the assessment is used, in part, as a normative 
mechanism to provide students with opportunities to exhibit 
proficiency, not only in the technical aspects of the learning, but 
as a way of demonstrating nascent professional or pre-
professional identity [40]. This includes such behaviours as 
thinking in the relevant modes of the discipline as well as 
espousing the values and norms of the profession. These are 
activities in which students which rely on the application of their 
prudential judgement about the profession and how it is lived in 
a concrete, situated context. 
It should, of course, be recognised that authenticity is a much 
broader concept than that discussed here in the context of 
assessment. The exploration of the concept of authenticity has a 
long history in philosophy and education. Splitter [41] cites it as 
“one of those ‘central, common but contestable’ concepts which 
cry out for continual reflection and (re)examination”. 
Philosophical and, later, psychological, interest in the concept is 
also strong, e.g. [42, 43, 44]. Taylor [45] summarises the ethical 
concerns of authenticity stating that “this notion gives a new 
importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point 
of my life; I miss what being human is for me." While these 
philosophical ideas about authenticity are extremely important 
and do, in fact, relate in a fundamental way to the wider issues 
of phronesis in the virtue ethics tradition inspired by Aristotle, 
they are not our main concern here. Instead, we turn our attention 
to an education setting in which the use of phronesis would be 
of vital importance. 
V. THE SOLUTION OF ILL-STRUCTURED OR OPEN-ENDED 
PROBLEMS 
So far, we have described a network of ideas starting with 
the classical notion of phronesis, moving through the 
educational imperative to enhance the practice of reflective 
judgement and identifying similar ideas which appear in the 
context of authentic learning. The element of "situatedness" 
which appears to some extent in consideration of all of these 
concepts will be discussed in the context of work-based learning. 
However, before we do this, we mention one further area in 
which practical judgement would be expected to play a 
significant role, that of the solution of ill-structured problems. 
The reason for this is straightforward. While well-structured 
problems usually give rise to convergent methods of solution, 
directed towards some unique set of values, ill-structured 
problems require a more nuanced appreciation of the process by 
which solutions are generated and a greater degree of 
justification of the answer. Indeed, while the development of the 
capacity for justification is important in any problem-solving 
activity, the process of doing this for a well-structured problem 
has been found to be qualitatively different to that used for an 
ill-structured problem. Solution of the former type of problem is 
mainly concerned with the development of logical arguments in 
support of the correct solution. However, this skill has been 
found to be independent of performance on ill-structured tasks 
[46]. The justification process for ill-structured problems 
requires an understanding of the fact that the target in the 
solution space is an optimal answer rather than correct solution, 
and that optimality is based on the solver's ability to choose 
between multiple alternatives, which may be based on a variety 
of different perspectives  
While acknowledging that the distinction between well-
structured problems and their ill-structured counterparts is not 
itself well-defined, and that such problems lies on a continuum, 
Voss [47] nevertheless provides a useful characterisation of the 
properties that distinguish examples of the two different types of 
problem. His starting point is that ill-structured problems are 
often stated in vague or ambiguous terms, requiring considerable 
explication or refinement to clarify the nature of the difficulty. 
The parameters that delineate the problem are not explicitly 
stated in the specification, requiring the solver to return to an 
examination of these constraints during the process of solution. 
There is also an iterative component to the process which 
involves finding a relevant representation of the problem, in 
addition to the technical component of applying appropriate 
methods of solution. This procedure often depends of the 
characteristics of individual problem-solvers, e.g. their 
epistemological or ontological beliefs [48, 49, 50, 51]. 
Consequently, there is no unique procedural trajectory to an 
answer within the problem space, and the process of solution 
generally gives rise to an iterative approach involving the 
modelling of the system (problem representation) followed by 
solution search. Both the problem representation and the method 
of solution may vary considerably between individuals. 
Moreover, the solution itself is typically to be assessed in 
pragmatic terms given some predetermined criteria of 
acceptability rather than being classified as either correct or 
incorrect, adequate or inadequate. However, the determination 
of the adequacy of the solution will typically itself be open to 
question and so any evaluation is subject to challenge. This 
means that the solution is stated in terms of levels of plausibility, 
and agreement or disagreement is more relevant than any 
identification of truth or falsity. There is, consequently, a 
process of rhetorical justification involved which is intrinsic to 
the method of solution. It also means that the solutions of ill-
structured problems are rarely, if ever, final, but are contingent 
on the circumstances which give rise to the problem statement. 
If these circumstances are themselves subject to change while 
the problem is in play, then implementation of any solution 
would need to be amended and subject to further evaluation. 
This open-endedness, or recognition of contingency, is an 
important characteristic. There is, therefore, an uncertainty 
about when a solution has been reached and this means that 
straightforward simulation of the problem can be extremely 
difficult or even prohibitively expensive.  
From this description of ill-structured problems, it is evident 
that the exercise of judgement plays a key role in any method of 
solution, and the development in this evaluative or inferential 
competence is a significant component in learning to represent 
and engage with such problems. This can be clearly seen in the 
context of work-based learning where learners are often put in 
positions in which the problems are ill-defined and open-ended, 
or depend upon the exercise of "professional" judgment about a 
course of action. 
VI. PHRONESIS IN A WORK-BASED LEARNING ENVIRONMENT 
The development of the capacity for phronesis is certainly 
not exclusive to the setting of work-based learning. If we 
consider the elements that cluster around the concept, it is clear 
that they include things like contextual judgement and the 
evaluation of the options and priorities necessary to accomplish 
complex tasks. These activities are contextual in the sense that 
the state of the system under investigation may have a direct or 
indirect impact upon the process of solution through a variety of 
feedback mechanisms. Relevant skills that would contribute to 
the solution of problems in this domain would include critical 
thinking and the ability to reflect upon the working environment. 
This situation describes a range of different learning situations 
which can be found in both traditional and non-traditional 
university settings and so it could be argued that it would be 
possible to develop the facility of phronetic judgement outside a 
work-based learning environment. This may well be true but 
from the perspective of ensuring authenticity in the learning 
process, this would seem somewhat contrived. 
It is true that elements of work-based learning, such as work 
placements or real-world projects, are now relatively common 
ways of engaging students with the more practical elements of 
their course and enhancing student employability, and these do 
provide opportunities to exercise the capacity of judgement. 
While the definition of what counts as WBL may depend upon 
the particular situation, we take it to include the type of learning 
environment that is informed by professional practices, and use 
the common characterisation of work-based learning as "any 
learning that is situated in the workplace or arises out of 
workplace concerns" [52]. Nevertheless, while drawing this 
boundary quite wide, there are still distinctions that can be made.  
We can, for example, distinguish between the original 
conception of work-based learning (e.g. [53]), workplace 
learning [54], work-integrated learning [55], and work-related 
learning [56]. The formulations of these are all slightly different 
with varied emphases. It is interesting to note, however, that 
some conceptions of work-based learning, especially those 
created early on in the development of the concept, were 
originally more transformational. Boud [26], for example, 
envisaged a situation in which students would "undertake study 
for a degree or diploma primarily in their workplace and their 
learning opportunities [would] not [be] contrived for study 
purposes but arise from normal work."  
Workplace learning is an interesting context in which to 
consider the concept of phronesis but it might be asked why we 
wish to raise this issue here. One response to this question is to 
note Kinsella [57], who, following Schön, states that 
professional practices are inevitably interpretive, that is, 
justificatory, practices. A central concern of professional activity 
is how to make correct judgements which are informed by 
reflection. If this is so, then the basis on which such judgements 
are made is of prime importance when investigating how 
professionals act in the workplace setting. Moreover, even if we 
consider examples of real-world activities within a university 
context rather than a work-based environment, the authenticity 
of these tasks depends at least partly on the fact that students are 
engaging in the modes of thinking and acting in the discipline. 
Authentic learning in such circumstances is therefore tied to the 
exercise of reflective, phronetic judgement. 
This can also be seen in the context of employability. 
According to Hinchliffe and Jolly [58], employers do not simply 
expect that graduates are able to process complex information in 
a procedural way, they presume they can also demonstrate 
cognitive maturity, exhibiting characteristics such as 
resourcefulness and working independently. There is an 
expectation that they can engage in problem-solving activities, 
and specifically, be able to defend any conclusions that are 
drawn and provide clear recommendations to others based on 
identifiable evidence. If this is so, then there is a general 
requirement for students to be given opportunities to justify their 
beliefs and make critical judgements in a professional manner. 
The workplace, or a simulation of this in the context of a real-
world project, would appear to provide just such an opportunity. 
VII. EXAMPLE APPLICATION AREA AND DISCUSSION 
Given the argument that an emphasis on phronesis – 
prudential judgement – should be a key feature of the higher 
education system, it is interesting to examine situations in which 
it appears as a constituent element in the learning programme. 
From previous discussion, concepts of examination, evaluation 
and justification should appear in those subjects in which design 
considerations play an important part. One example of this in an 
informal learning setting is the Hackathon concept [59, 60] 
which typically involves groups of developers assembling in 
informal groupings to engage in intensive sprint-like 
collaborative activities. Some effort has been made to extend 
this to a quasi-formal university environment while retaining the 
emphasis on student control and real-world application. One 
such example is a bachelor-level project-based course unit 
presented in the Department of Mathematical Information 
Technology in the University of Jyväskylä in Finland. This was 
a 12-week, 5-ECTS project course in which small groups of 
students conceived, designed and implemented software 
prototypes that made use of open-data sets and open APIs 
(Application Programming Interfaces) to create new, innovative 
services or applications. It was added to the curriculum in order 
to pave the way for a master-level industry-strength software 
project for real customers. The course unit aims were to increase 
student understandings of software process, project management 
issues, and group work, as well as to introduce them to questions 
surrounding intellectual property rights. The course was an 
option for a bachelor level practical course and was taken by 15–
26 students each year (with this cohort split into groups of four 
students). 
In this particular course unit, the groups were first made 
aware of the existence of various open resources on the web and 
then asked to develop and iterate project ideas by considering 
matches between personal interests and intentions, available 
data and APIs, and potential target groups. The resultant project 
ideas were presented after 2–3 weeks in a session where the 
groups receive feedback from peers and supervisors. The course 
unit is scaffolded with the inclusion of taught input on group 
concepts (fairness, statutes, roles, norms, and typical behaviour 
patterns anchored to these concepts) and the software process. 
Throughout the course unit, the development groups were 
required to work independently, scaffolded by short regular 
meetings with a teacher in charge and a senior student who 
provided technical guidance.  These meetings took place on a 
weekly basis and allowed discussion of emergent issues in group 
work and software processes. During the course, an expert 
lecture on intellectual property rights (IPR) was also provided. 
Groups presented their products during a day of final 
presentations in their project rooms to which faculty students 
and staff members were invited. The visiting audience was then 
given the opportunity to test project deliverables and discuss 
students’ project experiences. Passing the course required active 
participation with the minimum of 100 individual work hours 
reported, and a personal end-of-course learning report. 
This type of open-ended course unit demonstrates a learning 
environment in which self- and group-regulation are key 
elements in the success of both the project and the learning 
process. Groups are required to make decisions about aspects of 
technical support and project management. They make requests 
for faculty computing support regarding issues such as hardware 
and software installation, choice of programming languages, and 
project management tools. The make-up of the development 
team, the assignment of roles and the development process is, to 
a certain extent, also open with alternatives and further 
scaffolding presented. The software process is addressed at a 
conceptual level by emphasising principles such as commitment 
and situation awareness, and by discussing and conceptualising 
issues that arise during the project process. The desired course 
attributes (creativity and ill-formedness, and open-endedness), 
allow students take responsibility of project features, emphasise 
self-reliance. 
What features of this type of learning environment relate to 
the concept of phronesis or promote reflective or prudential 
judgement? Clearly for students to be successful in this situation, 
they need to exercise a number of personal attributes relating to 
individual learning, group working and There are a number of 
general capabilities which need to operate in order to perform 
well in this type of open-ended or ill-structured environment. 
Some of these relate to technical or interpersonal skills, which 
are clearly important when undertaking groupwork of this kind. 
However, if one examines what one might term the (intra) 
personal attributes needed to successfully complete this type of 
task, we believe that they can be broadly classified into two 
separate but connected areas – a metacognitive capability for 
self-regulation of learning [61, 62] within the learning 
environment, and a psychological disposition for self-reliance. 
The former underlies the cognitive abilities for self-direction 
and, ultimately, self-efficacy [37]. Zimmerman describes the 
cycle of phases of self-regulation in terms of forethought or 
planning, performance and self-reflection. In each of these, we 
see applications of phronetic activity: goal setting and strategic 
planning in the forethought phase, attention focussing in the 
performance phase and self-evaluation in the self-reflection 
phase. In each of these case, the learner needs to make practical 
judgements based on their knowledge and experience in that 
situation. Goal setting relies on the ability to discern what is 
appropriate, attention focussing on the ability to judge what is 
important, self-evaluation on the capacity to reflect on context 
and make suitable judgements about personal performance and 
how this can be moderated. In that sense, we would contend that 
phronesis is a fundamental underpinning of these processes.  
The second personal attribute is linked to the conceptions of 
resilience and self-reliance. Recent research has tended to 
characterise these concepts as manifests as manifestations of 
perseverance or persistence in terms of "grit" [63] or academic 
tenacity [64]. Duckworth defines grit as “the disposition to 
pursue long-term goals with sustained interest and effort over 
time” and considers it to be distinct from other traditionally 
measured facets of conscientiousness by its emphasis on 
stamina. In particular, grit entails the capacity to sustain both 
effort and interest in projects that take months or years to 
complete. Writing from a perspective of Self-theory, Dweck 
uses the term “academic tenacity” to denote a similar quality of 
self-reliance which manifests itself as “a mindset that looks 
beyond short-term concerns to longer-term or higher-order 
goals, and so withstands challenges and setbacks to persevere 
toward these goals”. Dweck’s emphasis on learner mindsets not 
only brings together aspects of personal epistemology with 
identity theory, but also considers the skills that are needed to 
overcome challenges and setbacks. One question which could be 
asked is what happens if a learner decides, say, that it is more 
prudent to not persist on a problem? Would this not entail 
prudential judgement being used to diminish a successful 
outcome? An Aristotelian response to this would be that a 
beneficial attitude or strategy, i.e. a virtue, is not seen as being a 
polar opposite to a single detrimental strategy – vice – but are 
rather seen as taking a mean between vices of excess and 
deficiency. So, a good behaviour such as perseverance, lies in 
the "Goldilocks zone" [65] between too little effort and too 
much, and of course, it is a matter of prudential judgement 
whereabouts on that spectrum this is. 
In both these cases, an underlying presupposition for the 
concept to be relevant and applicable in an educational context 
is that the learner has the ability to recognise beneficial strategies 
and act on them. This is, in essence, an application of phronesis, 
involving as it does, the integration of medium and long-term 
goal-seeking strategies and evaluative reasoning about 
priorities. In this context, it is worth reviewing the conclusions 
of Beecham et al [66] who address the question of whether the 
learning activities undertaken by software engineering students 
correlate with actual practice in a global software development 
team, especially within a small or medium-sized enterprise 
(SME). They report that global software engineering education, 
while providing technical content, still falls short of providing 
students with the skills in project management, interpersonal and 
leadership skills necessary to manage the collaboration 
processes which are part of the discipline, and this is accentuated 
in the context of an SME where there is greater fluidity in 
employee roles and responsibilities. They conclude that it will 
be necessary to develop approaches which "[wean] students off 
reliance on their instructors and [enable] them to take more 
active ownership of the course design and operation as an 
integral part of their learning".  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have sought to show that the concept of 
phronesis, developed in classical times to describe the 
disposition for practical wisdom and prudential judgement, 
remains an important element of the educational process. 
Moreover, the exercise of this disposition through the activity of 
reflective, contextual judgement is a fundamental component of 
a range of developmental pedagogical approaches. These seek 
to provide an authentic learning experience for students, in 
which they may begin to participate in the communities of 
practice of the professions. We have also attempted to trace a 
link between the idea of authentic learning and its expression in 
the solution of ill-structured problems which require the use of 
evaluative or interpretive judgements. The use of such 
judgements, and the requirement to justify action based on them, 
are ubiquitous features of work-based learning environments. 
We have also given a small but illustrative example of where 
this type of activity is being practiced. 
Hinchliffe and Walkington [67] state that an important aim 
of university education is getting students accustomed to make, 
defend and criticise such judgements. This has an 
epistemological benefit in that it demonstrates the contingent 
nature of knowledge but also provides the students with the 
opportunity to take responsibility for those judgments and 
consequent actions. If universities wish students to make a 
successful transition to a working environment in which they are 
expected to demonstrate the capability of making and defending 
judgements, then they must be presented with opportunities to 
develop that skill and so provision for it must be built into the 
curriculum.  
One final relevant comment may be made about the sense of 
value that society as a whole, and academia in particular, places 
upon certain types of knowledge. In his essay, "Why we need a 
philosophy of engineering: a work in progress", the philosopher 
Steven L. Goldman (2004) suggests that the type of problems 
solved by engineers are qualitatively different from those solved 
by scientists or mathematicians. Goldman contends that the 
Western philosophical tradition has generally tended to elevate 
universal, context-independent, "scientific" knowledge at the 
expense of context-dependent, contingent, situational 
knowledge. This is reflected in the privileged, epistemic status 
of the mathematical sciences when compared, say, to the 
engineering disciplines. The pursuit of certainty or universality, 
which is a feature of the scientific approach is not necessarily 
shared by engineering which works with contingent knowledge 
and has a focus on practical and pragmatic action. Clearly, 
scientific expertise is used in the creation of engineering 
artefacts and the solution of engineering problems, but the 
underlying philosophy of the subject is different and is based on 
a concept of design within a pragmatist framework. 
There are some parallels between this discussion and the 
distinction between episteme and phronesis, made earlier. 
Historically, for the most part, the educational remit of 
universities was to provide students with theoretical knowledge, 
even in a comparatively new discipline such as Computing. The 
development of curricular models based on ideas of competency 
has served to bring a more practical approach to subjects. 
However, techne – technical skill – while necessary must be 
accompanied by the ability to make appropriate practical, 
prudential and reflective judgements. Consequently, the 
opportunity to make such judgements should be an identifiable 
part of the computing and engineering curriculum. The more 
widespread use of embedded pedagogies, such as work-based 
learning in all its manifestations, provide opportunities for 
students to exercise their faculties of judgement but these ae not 
exhausted by work-based learning and the real challenge may be 
to incorporate this type of activity in more traditional learning 
activities.  
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